
The 2025 tennis championships are the first time Wimbledon has completely replaced their human line judges with an AI vision and decision system, Hawk-Eye. After only a week it caused controversy, with the system being updated, after it failed to call a glaringly out ball in a Centre Court match between Brit Sonay Kartal and Anastasia Pavlyuchenkova. Apparently it had been switched off by mistake mid-game. This raises issues inherent in all computer technology replacing humans: that they can go wrong, the need for humans-in-the-loop, the possibility of human error in their use, and what you do when they do go wrong.
Perhaps because it is a vision system rather than generative AI there has been little talk of whether Hawk-Eye is 100% accurate or not. Vision systems do not hallucinate in the way generative AI does, but they are still not infallible. The opportunity for players to appeal has been removed, however: in the original way Hawk-Eye was used humans made the call and players could ask for Hawk-Eye to check. Now, Hawk-Eye makes a decision and basically that is it. A picture is shown on screen of a circle relative to the line, generated by Hawk-Eye to ‘prove’ the ball was in or out as claimed. It is then taken as gospel. Of course, it is just reflecting Hawk-Eye’s decision – what it “saw” – not reality and not any sort of actual separate evidence. It is just a visual version of the call shouted. However, it is taken as though it is absolute proof with no argument possible. If it is aiming to be really, really dependable then Hawk-Eye will have multiple independent systems sensing in different ways and voting on the result – as that is one of the ways computer scientists have invented to program dependability. However, whether it is 100% accurate isn’t really the issue. What matters is whether it is more accurate, making fewer mistakes, than human line judges do. Undoubtedly it is, so is therefore an improvement and some uncaught mistakes are not actually the point.
However, the mistake in this problem call was different. The operators of the system had switched it off mistakenly mid-match due to “human error”. That raises two questions. First, why was it designed to that a human could accidentally turn it off mid-match – don’t blame that person as it should not have been possible in the first place. Fix the system so it can’t happen again. That is what within a day the Lawn Tennis Association claim to have done (whether resiliently remains to be seen).
However, the mistake begs another question. Wimbledon had not handed the match over to the machines completely. A human umpire was still in charge. There was a human in the loop. They, however, had no idea the system was switched off we were told until the call for a ball very obviously out was not made. If that is so, why not? Hawk-Eye supposedly made two calls of “Stop”. Was that its way of saying “I am not working so stop the match”? If it was such an actual message to the umpire it is not a very clear way to make it, and guarantees to be disruptive. It sounds a lot like a 404 error message, added by a programmer for a situation that they do not expect to occur!
A basic requirement of a good interactive system is that the system state is visible – that it is not even switched on should have been totally obvious in the controls the umpire had well before the bad call. That needs to be fixed too, just in case there is still a way Hawk-Eye can still be switched off. It begs the question of how often has the system been accidentally switched off, or powered down temporally for other reasons, with no one knowing, because there was no glaringly bad call to miss at the time.
Another issue is the umpire supposedly did follow the proper procedure which was not to just call the point (as might have happened in the past given he apparently knew “the ball was out!”) but instead had the point replayed. That was unsurprisingly considered unfair by the player who lost a point they should have won. Why couldn’t the umpire make a decision on the point? Perhaps, because humans are no longer trusted at all as they were before. As suggested by Pavlyuchenkova there is no reason why there cannot be a video review process in place so that the umpire can make a proper decision. That would be a way to add back in a proper appeal process.
Also, as was pointed out, what happens if the system fully goes down, does Wimbledon now have to just stop until Hawk-Eye is fixed: “AI stopped play”. We have lots of situations over many decades as well as recently of complex computer systems crashing. Hawk-Eye is a complex system so problems are likely possible. Programmers make mistakes (and especially when doing quick fixes to fix other problems as was apparently just done). If you replace people by computers, you need a reliable and appropriate backup that can kick into place immediately from the outset. A standard design principle is that programs should help avoid humans making mistakes, help them quickly detect them when they do and help them recover.
A tennis match is not actually high stakes by human standards. No one dies because of mistakes (though a LOT of money is at stake), but the issues are very similar in a wide range of systems where people can die – from control of medical devices, military applications, space, aircraft and nuclear power plant control…all of which computers are replacing humans. We need good solutions, and they need to be in place before something goes wrong not after. An issue as systems are more and more automated is that the human left in the loop to avoid disaster has more and more trouble tracking what the machine is doing as they do less and less, so making it harder to step in and correct problems in a timely way (as was likely the case with the Wimbledon umpire). The humans need to not just be a little bit in the loop but centrally so. How you do that for different situations is not easy to work out but as tennis has shown it can’t just be ignored. There are better solutions than Wimbledon are using but to even consider them you have to first accept that computers do make mistakes so know there is a problem to be solved.
– Paul Curzon, Queen Mary University of London
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